“We are much better prepared for Trump than in 2017”

The Reichstag in Berlin, where the German Bundestag is located.
The first edition of Atlantik-Brücke’s virtual event series on foreign and security policy, “Better Be Prepared”, on Germany’s snap election brought together four parliamentarians of the parties from the democratic center. In this conversation they discuss what they have planned for Germany’s role in Europe vis-à-vis the new U.S. administration, its commitment to NATO and engagement in geopolitics. This is a slightly edited and shortened version of the full transcript of the discussion.
Moderated by Friederike von Tiesenhausen
Atlantik-Brücke: With me today to talk about Trump, trade and defense are four distinguished speakers from the German Parliament. To start us off, I’d like to turn to Jürgen Hardt, who was one of the very few Germans in Washington for the inauguration. What did you take away from that day?
Jürgen Hardt: I’m sure that President Trump has the full support, not only from the two houses of the Congress, but also from the party members on the street. The second point I saw, and this is what we expected to see, is that Trump will be much better prepared for the second term than for his first term in office.

Jürgen Hardt
Atlantik-Brücke: What does this mean for German foreign policy?
Hardt: There are two big challenges in foreign and security issues as well as trade issues. President Trump didn’t mention Germany or Europe in his inauguration speech, but he mentioned the automobile industry. He does not know about the fact that the biggest exporter of cars from the United States to the world is not General Motors and not Ford. It’s BMW. In trade generally I expect a big confrontation. We will see concrete actions towards Europe.
In foreign and security issues, Trump has asked Germany to do much more in NATO and Europe as a whole and on Ukraine. Maybe not on the military side, because I think that he will stay with the commitment to the military support for Ukraine, but on the financial support for the state structures, civil and economic development.
Atlantik-Brücke: Nils Schmid, how do you see German foreign policy having to respond to Trump 2.0?
Nils Schmid: There’s a broad consensus on the transatlantic relationship among democratic parties in Germany. Jürgen is maybe a little bit too optimistic about Trump and about the possibilities to deal with him. When it comes to trade and tariffs, for example, you can count on Trump to be very aggressive. The European Union needs to take a unified stand and needs to be prepared for countermeasures. The Trump administration must know that there are consequences to this kind of unilateral measures when it comes to security.
The European Union needs to take a unified stand and needs to be prepared for countermeasures.Nils Schmid
In terms of burden sharing within NATO, we have known for years that Europe should take on more responsibility, pay more for defense and solidify defense planning. That will be the task for the new federal government in Germany.
Trump is the first and only U.S. President after the Second World War, who actively undermines European integration. That should give us some incentive to do more for a unified European foreign and security policy.
Atlantik-Brücke: Omid Nouripour, your party was in charge of foreign policy for the past three years in the so-called traffic light coalition. What will the foreign policy of the Green Party have to reflect and what are the lessons going forward?
Omid Nouripour: The first thing I have to underline is that we are much better prepared than we’ve been in 2017. We know whom we are talking to. Second, it’s much more complicated. We just don’t know what the next steps of the U.S. administration in Ukraine, on trade and on technology are going to be.
Let me very briefly just mention the three biggest challenges we have in Europe and the three answers we have to give. The first is the question of security and I fully agree with you that we have to do much more as Europe. This is a question of integration of military and skills in Europe. And of course, it’s about Ukraine. If Ukraine is falling, there’s going to be a huge war around us and within our countries. I fully agree that the second challenge is the question of tariffs and trade.And the third one is technology.
The worst case for Europe is that there are technology battles between China and the US. This is about us just being part of that as part of the American phalanx. This is about our sovereignty, to have our own stakes there. We’ve been not good enough. For all three challenges, we have to come together and find common solutions and there is a huge awareness for that in Europe.
The worst case for Europe is that there are technology battles between China and the US. This is about us just being part of that as part of the American phalanx. This is about our sovereignty, to have our own stakes there.Omid Nouripour
And of course, we need a global strategy. China is a rogue state when it comes to the values and when it comes to systemic risk. But we have to cooperate with all of the other countries all across the globe. Especially in the fields, which are not that easy to cooperate with the new U.S. administration.
Atlantik-Brücke: Before we dive more deeply into the issue of trade and how to keep Europe together on this, I’d like to give Gyde a chance to outline what a liberal foreign policy for Germany would look like.
Gyde Jensen: We encourage the ties between the United States and the German Government not only in Washington, D.C., but also in the states in the whole country. This is not only about bringing policies and politicians together, but rather leading by example towards the very strong ties that our societies have. There is a pond between us, but we are democracies, and we breathe the same air.
This is not only about bringing policies and politicians together, but rather leading by example towards the very strong ties that our societies have.Gyde Jensen
Germany and Europe should be self-confident when we face negotiations with the Trump administration. There is no need for being timid. We should rather focus on our trade and export driven economy. This is a very good circumstance to actually fly over to the United States and have these talks. This is very much overdue, whenever we have a new set of parliamentarians in the next German Bundestag.
Germany and Europe should be self-confident when we face negotiations with the Trump administration. There is no need for being timid.Gyde Jensen
Generally spoken, our foreign policy will have to deal with the prospect in the upcoming years to fight for our freedom. Not only Ukraine is doing that, we also need to step up.

Nils Schmid
Atlantik-Brücke: Nils, Germany was not exactly able to lead and synthesize a common position in the EU in recent years – for example, on tariffs for Chinese electric cars. What would you do differently in the future so that Europe speaks with this united voice?
Schmid: When it comes to Chinese electric vehicles, you have to admit that the way the EU Commission devised the special tariffs was really ill advised because they punished European importers more than other EU member states.
However, what we need to do, is to stand up against these very narrow-minded ideas about tariffs and trade coming out of the Trump administration. At the same time, especially when it comes to counter growing Chinese influence in world trade, we should offer opportunities of cooperation to the new administration in Washington. And we’ve come to a point where we need to explain to our American friends that if they want to take on China, they need allies in East Asia, countries like South Korea and Japan and others.
We need to explain to our American friends that if they want to take on China, they need allies in East Asia, countries like South Korea and Japan and others.Nils Schmid
Atlantik-Brücke: The CDU/CSU election program explicitly mentions the will to push for a new transatlantic trade agreement. Jürgen, people might say, given everything that comes out of Washington at the moment, that seems a bit naive. In what goods and services do you see scope for a new TTIP?
Hardt: Punctually, probably it’s possible to work together, maybe also together with the concept of becoming more independent from Asian markets and special technologies as semiconductors.
But I think, the biggest challenge with the trade policy of President Trump is that he is promoting a way which is harming the United States more than others. There’s a big misunderstanding in national economics, and also with Donald Trump, that the negative trade balance of the United States is a result of a weakness of the US. However, it’s the result of the fact that the US is much richer than the rest of the world, and therefore U.S. citizens have not to do all the work they need to in order to keep their level of welfare. And due to the fact that the U.S. dollar is the world’s reserve currency, the United States is able to compensate that. Therefore, every tariff increase by Donald Trump is mostly paid by American citizens or companies in the United States. Therefore, we need to have an intense dialogue with our colleagues in the Congress.
The biggest challenge with the trade policy of President Trump is that he is promoting a way which is harming the United States more than others.Jürgen Hardt
Donald Trump has two imperatives. The first imperative is growth, which is a contradiction to tariffs, and the second imperative is China. From the European side we should tell President Trump that we also have some concerns with the trade policy of China and with the political development in China and that we therefore ask for a common approach, which is not overwhelming China, but limiting its negative impact on trade. We should do that together.
We have a new government in Germany maybe around Easter in the second half of April. In June, we have the European Union summit. Then, we have the NATO summit, probably with Donald Trump, and we have the G7 summit in Canada. For all three events, the new chancellor has to bring a strong position of Germany to the table.
In June, we have the European Union summit. Then, we have the NATO summit, probably with Donald Trump, and we have the G7 summit in Canada. For all three events, the new chancellor has to bring a strong position of Germany to the table.Jürgen Hardt
Atlantik-Brücke: The US has asked of Europe for a while, not just under this administration, to pivot away from its dependence on China. Gyde, how should the next German government walk this thin line between de-risking and depriving Germany of this vital export market?
Jensen: If Germany wants to take a strong stance vis-à-vis China, also with regard to the US, we should try to be more one-voiced from a European perspective. It would help if Europe could agree more on one direction towards China. Nobody else can help us to do this.
If Germany wants to take a strong stance vis-à-vis China, also with regard to the US, we should try to be more one-voiced from a European perspective.Gyde Jensen
We should focus more on diversifying also with other Asian countries. Diversification would also help towards restraining China’s influence in our European partner countries. On the other hand, the German and European companies still need the Chinese market.
Atlantik-Brücke: Let’s move on to defense and NATO. Germany has in recent years finally reached the 2% goal of spending of GDP for defense matters. Omid, wouldn’t it be honest to say to the population in Germany that security has a price tag, and we now have to prioritize security over social spending?
Nouripour: This is not about playing these two issues against each other. More security needs more investment. We have a huge lack of investments for the last decade in the German armed forces. It’s about more than 2% that we have to spend if you want to modernize the armed forces in a sufficient way. This is why my party is talking about 3.5%.
But you know, at the end of the day, it’s not about figures, it’s about what is needed and the war in Ukraine. Every single penny we are spending in these days for defense is preventing the next war in Europe. And we have to also fulfill our obligations within NATO.
Every single penny we are spending in these days for defense is preventing the next war in Europe.Omid Nouripour
Atlantik-Brücke: Jürgen, do you feel there’s enough honesty about this trade-off in the German election campaign between spending for security in contrast to other policy areas?
Hardt: A better performance of Germany’s economy would first lead to more income on the state side. We as CDU also plan to take some areas out of the federal budget, for example special investment in infrastructure.
Even if we increase our defense expenditure significantly, it will not be done tomorrow to reach new capabilities. Investments in the German Bundeswehr will take some years to fully materialize. Germany, and this is my proposal probably for the NATO Summit, should also do more on the qualitative side. The Bundeswehr should become the main pillar of NATO in Europe. This should be an offer that also might impress Trump and Republicans in Washington. But this needs to be well prepared.
Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to give Nils the chance to comment on this. What is the single most effective step Germany can take to strengthen the European pillar in NATO?
Schmid: First of all, let me say that I emphatically disagree with my two colleagues. We need an honest debate about how to finance bigger spending on defense. This has been a blind spot for many years and there are only three ways you can increase spending for armed forces. The first is to raise taxes. The second is to cut other expenditures, and the third is to raise the public deficit. Most probably we will need all three ways.
But with the current debt brake in place, we will not be able to fulfill the obligations of a decent state for our citizens, be it external or domestic security, be it social security, be it infrastructure spending. So, we need to fix this on the national level by reforming the debt brake, our constitutional balanced budget rule. Or as an alternative, we need to flexibilize European rules on public debt, the so-called Maastricht rules of the Stability Pact. This needs to be implemented as soon as possible, because we are now in a situation where we urgently need to do more for defense.
We should also streamline spending of European governments, first of all by harmonizing technical standards and reducing the diversity of weapons programs run by European governments, but also secondly by investing into common projects. This is also some news for our American partners. We will buy more European military equipment in the future, otherwise we cannot develop a strong European defense industry.
For a transitional period, we will need to purchase a modern weaponry from our American friends, as the German government under Chancellor Scholz did by acquiring F-35 fighter planes for nuclear sharing and for European air defense. But in the long-term perspective, this will be very much about procuring European weapon systems from European producers.
Atlantik-Brücke: Jürgen and Gyde, don’t you think, given the changed geopolitical circumstances, there is a case for doing all those three things that Nils has mentioned?
Hardt: A discussion on the debt brake might be misunderstood in other European Union member states, especially in member states of the eurozone. I fear that in case that Germany is losing its restrictions on spending, others will follow. And I fear that we will have a second euro crisis on the horizon, if Germany is losing its strong measures.
But on the other hand, we have this 100 billion Euro extra budget agreed on for the German Bundeswehr by changing the constitution, without harming the debt brake. So, we have the concept.

Gyde Jensen
Jensen: There should be enough money in our budget currently, even within the debt brake, for us to ensure a quality of procurement and of capacity building for our armed forces.
We should not discuss so much about numbers, whether it be now 2% or 3.5%, but rather on having a strong economy which allows us to focus on better defense spending. I wouldn’t focus on the sheer numbers, but rather on the quality of the spending.
We should not discuss so much about numbers, whether it be now 2% or 3.5%, but rather on having a strong economy which allows us to focus on better defense spending.Gyde Jensen
Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to touch on two geographical issues. One is Ukraine, quite obvious, and the other is the Arctic. Omid, what do you see as Germany’s contribution to bringing about and possibly maintaining a peace in Ukraine?
Nouripour: The core of the conflict in Ukraine is about the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people. If the Ukrainian people at the end tell us that they want to come to the table of negotiations and they are ready to freeze this line or that line of the front and they are ready to not give up, but understand that for the next couple of years, maybe they will not achieve the entire recovery of their territorial sovereignty, this is what we have to respect.
The core of the conflict in Ukraine is about the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people.Omid Nouripour
But this is not about Washington, Moscow, Brussels, Berlin or whomever to tell the Ukraine people what the solution for their country is. If you do not understand this as the core of the conflict, we all are going to lose. And then Moscow is going to win.
This is why we support back channel talks in these days and I’m very happy that the timeline of the new U.S. administration is not 24 hours of a solution. It’s rather six months or more.
This is all about the countries in Europe, especially our closest partners in Eastern and Central Europe, in Poland and the Baltics. We have to understand that the entire calculation of Putin is to divide Europe through his full-scale escalation in Ukraine.
Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to turn to the Arctic. The floated idea that Trump would like to buy Greenland is very much on the agenda again. Nils, what are the German and European interests in this region now that the ice around the North Pole is melting and shipping routes and routes for military vessels are opening up?
Schmid: Certainly, we do have a strategic interest in the future of the Arctic. We have a very strong position as Europeans and Americans, especially when it comes to Greenland, because this is all NATO area, and we should respect that. Americans and Europeans should try to fend off opponents, especially China and Russia from interfering in these areas.
You may only count on hard power in some circles of Washington, but I would presume that soft power is still part of foreign policy, and the Trump team should not underestimate the value of soft power.Nils Schmid
What I sense is a terrible drop in American soft power in the last two weeks since Trump took over. You may only count on hard power in some circles of Washington, but I would presume that soft power is still part of foreign policy, and the Trump team should not underestimate the value of soft power.

Omid Nouripour
Nouripour: If one U.S. soldier enters Greenland, this will be the end of NATO, and it would encourage Russia to invade the Baltics. The U.S. administration has to understand that the consequences would be huge and that it would be their responsibility.
Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to synthesize a couple of questions that have come in on the chat function. One of our audience members phrases that Trump appears poised to make disruptions. Jürgen, what are areas where you see the US and Germany and Europe being able to positively disrupt something together?
Hardt: In the field of technology, we have to make sure that not only China occupies special modern technologies and creates a monopoly. We need to have a diversification in this area. We are much stronger if we match capabilities of Europe and North America by building two big pillars of development that are in competition and therefore better than all the others. We should definitively enhance our joint activities in the Trade and Technology Council (TTC).
Atlantik-Brücke: One last question: Nils, which countries do you think will lead a European foreign policy?
Schmid: Within the European Union, it certainly will be the Weimar Triangle, and we had to wait for a very right-wing government in Poland to be vanquished by a more modern government to revitalize this format, and I think now is the time to recharge this initiative.
And we should not forget about Great Britain. I believe that when it comes to foreign and security policy, as we’ve seen over the last three years in Ukraine, the contribution of the United Kingdom can be crucial, and we should consider closer ties between the European Union and Great Britain in the future.
Jürgen Hardt is the Foreign Policy Spokesman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group. Gyde Jensen is the Deputy Chairwoman of the FDP Parliamentary Group. Omid Nouripour until recently was the Chairman of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and is a Member of the Board of Atlantik-Brücke. Nils Schmid is the Foreign Policy Spokesman of the SPD Parliamentary Group.
Friederike von Tiesenhausen is Global Head of Public Affairs at Bloomberg LP and a Member of the Board of Atlantik-Brücke.